Law in the Face of Disruptive Technology by Kolacz, M.K. (Marta) & Quintavalla, A. (Alberto)
Law in the Face of Disruptive Technology,
An Introduction
Marta Katarzyna KOŁACZ and Alberto QUINTAVALLA*
Disruptive innovations provoke controversial political responses. They affect
established business models and settled social norms. The question faced by society
is whether and how to regulate innovation. The question grows more pressing as
innovation grows more rapid. In pre-antiquity, innovation similarly engendered major
changes to society. For example, improvements in irrigation technology caused whole
populations to migrate to large cities in Ancient Egypt. The pace of social change was,
however, comparatively slow, as was the diffusion of technology. It could take
hundreds of years for a new technology – say an improvement in agriculture – to
spread. The resultant social pressures, even if signiﬁcant, did not require wide-scale
interventions into the economy. Indeed, they did not even require the formation of
government.
But we now live in a time of rapid change: technologies are developing fast, digital
economies are emerging and markets are growing more integrated. Netﬂix rendered
DVDs obsolete. What Netﬂix did to DVDs is what Uber will do to taxis. Incipient
technologies, such as nanorobotics and genetic engineering, are widely forecast to
revolutionise our lives. The impact of all those technologies is unknown and to some
extent unknowable. In the context of that uncertainty, the role of law, legislators, courts
and regulators is paramount.
At its core, the concept of “disruptive innovation” refers to business models or
technologies that challenge incumbent businesses, successfully targeting overlooked
market segments. In common parlance, the term has begun to encompass all
technological and business breakthroughs which reshape markets. Such innovations
lead to a need to reassess the effectiveness of the existing legal frameworks and, if
appropriate, to reform the law.
The legislator faces a difﬁcult choice: either let judges decide according to the current
law, or promulgate new legislation. Although these two options may seem mutually
exclusive, they also overlap. Thus, the legislator may decide to let judges decide cases
according to pre-existing rules at ﬁrst. Once the new dynamics are fully understood, new
statutes may be drafted or old ones amended.
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This Special Issue tries to draw a picture of where the regulatory discussions of
disruptive innovation stand. The general problem at stake is the choice of regulation to
deal with a rapidly changing environment. More precisely, there is a choice between
using old laws and writing new ones. Should the law change to reﬂect progress in
common conceptions of morality, technology, or economic conditions? Or should the
law regard the newly developed issues as contemporary manifestations of old legal
categories? The central purpose of this Special Issue is to offer answers to the following
questions.
1. Do disruptive innovations create a need for new norms?
2. What legal instruments can tackle the issues put forward by these innovations?
3. Are pre-existing general principles enough to guarantee legal certainty in an age of
innovation?
Whilst Ronald Dworkin may have preferred to see Hercules search for the right
answer amongst the law reports, Jeremy Bentham may have chosen to begin drafting a
new statute. We consider the relative efﬁcaciousness of these approaches here, in the
hope that our contributions may serve as a useful manual to lawyers faced with
disruptive innovations. The individual insights shed more light on the topic, hopefully
leading to a more systematic view on the viable regulatory approaches. The selected
contributions aim to provide guidance as to how regulators can respond to disruptive
innovations.
The Special Issue starts with the contribution of Kołacz, Quintavalla and Yalnazov,
who discuss disruptive innovations. They distinguish between risky and uncertain
innovations, using autonomous cars and 3D printing as examples. The primary concern
of the paper is the cost of acquiring information by judges and legislators in the process
of regulating new technologies. The authors argue that the judiciary is better suited to the
regulation of risky technologies, whereas uncertain technologies should be regulated
through statute. Their contribution also provides a general framework for further papers
focusing solely on speciﬁc instances of disruptive technologies.
The aggregation of information necessary to make regulatory decisions about new
technologies is further tackled in Buiten’s submission. Buiten discusses the issue in the
context of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and its transparency. She argues that AI transparency
requires focusing on the concrete risks and biases of its underlying technology: machine-
learning algorithms. Any transparency requirement for algorithms should result in
explanations of biases that algorithms may present. These have to be simultaneously
comprehensible to prospective recipients and technically feasible to producers. AI
transparency would then enable judges to adjudicate on the risks of AI technology.
Thereafter, the Special Issue focuses on the tension between existing legal rules
applied to new circumstances and new legislative interventions tailored to speciﬁc
innovations. This is discussed in the context of Airbnb, 3D printing and genetic
engineering.
Wells’ paper focuses on Airbnb, which has led to a rise in the use of residential
properties as short-term lets. Wells considers the social efﬁciency of the use of the public
town planning system and alternative private law systems to regulate spill-over amenity
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effects on neighbouring properties. He argues that in the case of short-term lets, the
private law system entails relatively low transaction costs. The courts, properly equipped
with private information from litigants and public information from development plans,
are well placed to regulate Airbnb.
The discussion on Airbnb is followed by a paper by Heine and Li, who circle on the
inﬂuence of 3D printing on product liability law. Heine and Li ask why incumbent
product liability law does not incentivise optimal deterrence to harmful 3D printed
products. They conclude that new business models associated with 3D printing are not
dominated by economies of scale. This results in reduced information production. The
scarcity of information prevents courts from being able to identify tortfeasors.
The Special Issue concludes with Lansink’s contribution. Lansink discusses the legal
aspects of technological innovation and animal use. She shows that genetic engineering
and cloning might render EU and UK animal protection laws ineffective. She seeks a
solution in the established concept of dignity, proving the durability of pre-existing legal
categories.
Whether disruptive innovations create a need for new norms depends on the
regulator’s understanding of the technologies, as well as on the ability of jurists to
position new social phenomena within old legal categories. In other words, as our
understanding of the social impact of new technology improves, so do our chances of
regulating innovations adequately. We are reasonably well-informed about autonomous
cars, genetic engineering, and AirBnB, and less well-informed about 3D printing. We
can regulate some things well, but not others. As a result, our system of regulation is
imperfect. We are hopeful that the papers in this Special Issue are a ﬁrst step in
remedying its inadequacies.
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